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Abstract
We propose a new method for opportunistic power control in multi-carrier interference channels for
delay-tolerant data services. In doing so, we utilize a game theoretic framework with novel constraints,
where each user tries to maximize its utility in a distributed and opportunistic manner, while satisfying
the game’s constraints by adapting its transmit power to its channel. In this scheme, users transmit with
more power on good sub-channels and do the opposite on bad sub-channels. In this way, in addition to
the allocated power on each sub-channel, the total power of all users also depends on channel conditions.
Since each user’s power level depends on power levels of other users, the game belongs to the generalized
Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems, which in general, is hard to analyze. We show that the proposed
game has a GNE, and derive the sufficient conditions for its uniqueness. Besides, we propose a new
pricing scheme for maximizing each user’s throughput in an opportunistic manner under its total power
constraint; and provide the sufficient conditions for the algorithm’s convergence and its GNE’s uniqueness.
Simulations confirm that our proposed scheme yields a higher throughput for each user and/or has a
significantly improved efficiency as compared to other existing opportunistic methods.
Index Terms
Game theory, multi-carrier interference channel, generalized Nash equilibrium, opportunistic power
control, pricing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Frequency spectrum of a network can be divided into many orthogonal sub-channels that can be shared
by all users. However, shared usage of spectrum by a user produces interference to other users. As the
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2number of users increases, users’ received interference levels increase as well, resulting in fewer users
that can achieve their required quality of service (QoS). In such instances, efficient use of spectrum
becomes more important, meaning that users should transmit at their lowest possible power levels while
satisfying their required data rates.
Radio resource allocation in multi-carrier wireless networks aims to allocate available resources to users
in such a way that under some system and service constraints, a performance measure for each user,
e.g., the total throughput or the total transmit power, is optimized. In distributed resource allocation, each
user chooses its strategy (required resources) independent of other users. Game theory [1] is commonly
used in the literature to analyze distributed resource allocation algorithms by formulating the problem
as a non-cooperative game, where each user competes with other users with a view to optimizing its
own utility. The game settles at its Nash equilibrium (NE), where no user can improve its utility by
unilaterally changing its strategy.
In the context of distributed resource allocation, the problem of power minimization under throughput
constraint is considered in [2], [3]. In this problem, each user tries to minimize its total consumed power
over all sub-channels while maintaining its total throughput above a predefined threshold. In such a game,
since the strategy space of each user depends on the chosen strategies of other users, the game cannot be
analyzed by way of the conventional Nash equilibrium, and the so called generalized Nash equilibrium
(GNE) should be used [4]. In [2], the game is simulated, and in [3], the game is mathematically analyzed
and the sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of GNE, as well as the sufficient conditions
for the convergence of the distributed algorithm are presented.
The counterpart of this problem in single carrier systems is known as the target SINR-tracking power-
control algorithm (TPC) [5]. In TPC, each user tries to choose its transmit power in a distributed manner
with a view to satisfying its predefined target SINR. An important issue in TPC is its feasibility, meaning
that the algorithm converges only if a power vector exists such that the target SINRs of all users are
satisfied. In TPC, users adapt their transmit power levels to their channel conditions, i.e., each user
increases its transmit power when its channel is bad, and does the reverse when its channel is good.
Likewise, minimizing the transmit power under the data rate constraint may not be feasible, as there may
not be a power vector that satisfies the data rate constraints for all users, meaning that no GNE may
exist. Also, since users consume more power when their channels are bad, they increase their interference
to others, which in turn forces others to increase their transmit power levels, and thus aggravating the
situation further for all users.
To avoid such a case for delay-tolerant services, it is worthwhile for users to reduce their transmit
3power (which would result in lower data rates) when their channels are bad, and do the reverse when their
channels are good. This is the opportunistic power control (OPC) that was introduced and analyzed in
[6] for single carrier systems. The alternative OPC for multi-carrier systems is that users try to maximize
their total throughput over all sub-channels in a distributed manner when the total transmit power for each
user is constrained. This game has been extensively analyzed in [7]–[11], and different conditions for
the uniqueness of NE and for the convergence of the distributed algorithms are obtained. The drawbacks
of this scheme include causing interference without any gain by a transmitting user when its channel is
bad, and convergence to an inefficient NE because of self-serving and independent users.
In [7], the data rate maximization game is analyzed and the sufficient conditions for NE’s uniqueness
are obtained. In addition, by interpreting the waterfilling solution as a projector and using its contraction
property [12], in [8], [9], the sufficient conditions for the convergence of the iterative waterfilling solution
are derived. Using linear complementarity [10] reformulation of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition
[13] of the rate maximization game, in [14], the linear complementarity conditions are converted to the
affine variational inequality [15], and the sufficient conditions for NE’s uniqueness and convergence of
the iterative waterfilling algorithm are obtained. In [11], the sufficient conditions for NE’s uniqueness and
convergence of the iterative waterfilling algorithm are established by interpreting the waterfilling solution
as a piecewise affine function [15].
In a non-cooperative game, since each user selfishly tries to optimize its own utility, the equilibrium of
the game may not be a desirable one. In such cases, pricing is an effective mechanism to control users’
behaviors and achieve a more efficient NE. The proposed pricing in [16], [17] for the rate maximization
game is a linear function of the transmit power. In [16], only numerical results are presented that provide
some insight on NE’s uniqueness and convergence of the distributed algorithm, whereas in [17], a
mathematical analysis based on the notion of variational inequalities and non-linear complementarity
is presented to obtain the sufficient conditions for NE’s existence and for convergence of the distributed
algorithm.
In this paper, we propose an OPC for multi-carrier interference channels using a game theoretic
framework. In our scheme, each user opportunistically tries to maximize its total transmit power over all
sub-channels in a distributed manner with a view to maximizing its data rate while satisfying the given
constraint on the total transmit power that depends on interference levels in sub-channels. In doing so,
higher transmit power levels are allocated to sub-channels with low interference, and lower power levels
to high interference sub-channels. This is in contrast to the rate maximization game with total power
constraint irrespective of interference levels on sub-channels [2], [14].
4For the proposed game, we analyze the existence of GNE. Similar to the power minimization game with
data rate constraint, the strategy space of a user in our proposed scheme depends on the strategies chosen
by other users. However, we will show that at least one GNE is guaranteed to exist for the proposed
scheme. In addition, we obtain the sufficient conditions for GNE’s uniqueness, and for the convergence of
the distributed algorithm. We also introduce pricing to the rate maximization game for controlling selfish
users and providing incentives for behaving in an opportunistic manner. In doing so, pricing is a function
of the user’s transmit power and the interference experienced by that user. Furthermore, we obtain the
sufficient conditions for NE’s uniqueness, and for the the distributed algorithm’s convergence by utilizing
variational inequalities as in [3], [8], [14], [17]. By way of simulation, we evaluate the performance of
our proposed OPC, as well as that of the pricing-based data rate maximization problem, and show that
the total throughput of users is increased as compared to when pricing is not applied.
This paper is organized as follows. A brief review of the TPC and the OPC algorithms is provided in
Section II. The opportunistic power control problem is studied in Section III, and our pricing is introduced
in Section IV. Simulation results are presented in Section V, and conclusions are in Section VI.
II. TPC AND OPC IN SINGLE CARRIER SYSTEMS
Consider a single carrier wireless network with M active users that are spread in its coverage area. Let
the channel gain between the transmitter of user j and the receiver of user i be Gi,j , and noise power at
the receiver of user i be ηi. When user i transmits at power level pi, its SINR, denoted by γi is
γi =
Gi,ipi∑
j 6=i
Gi,jpj + ηi
. (1)
We denote the effective interference by
Ii =
∑
j 6=i
Gi,jpj + ηi
Gi,i
. (2)
The value of Ii depends on power levels of users (i.e., Ii(p)), but for simplicity in notation, we use Ii.
Consider a case in which each user chooses its power level in a distributed and iterative manner with
a view to maintaining its SINR above a predefined threshold, i.e., γi ≥ γˆi. In this case, a distributed
algorithm for achieving a given fixed target SINRs (TPC) as in [5] is
pi(n+ 1) =
γˆi
γi(n)
pi(n). (3)
5When the system is feasible, i.e., if there exists a power vector p = [p1, · · · , pM ] such that the SINR
constraints are satisfied, this algorithm converges to the solution of the following problem
min
∑
pi (4)
subject to: γi ≥ γˆ ∀i,
where all constraints are satisfied with the equality.
To maintain a predefined SINR, a user with a bad channel transmits at high power and causes
interference to other users with no apparent benefit to itself. To increase the system throughput, for
delay-tolerant services, it is better that users with bad channels reduce their transmit power even to 0,
and users with good channels do the reverse, and both groups adapt their data rates to their respective
transmit power levels. This is the OPC algorithm, defined by
pi(n+ 1) =
ζi
Ii(n)
, (5)
where ζi is a predefined constant and Ii(n) is the effective interference experienced by user i in iteration
n as defined in (2). As such, each user transmits at a rate given by
Ri = log(1 + γi), (6)
where γi is defined in (1). From (5), it is clear that when the channel is bad, i.e., when Ii is high, the
user decreases its transmit power, and when the channel is good, i.e., when Ii is low, it does the opposite.
For a given transmit power level, the OPC’s throughput is higher than that of TPC.
III. OPPORTUNISTIC POWER CONTROL
A. Problem Formulation
We now formulate the opportunistic power control problem for multi-carrier interference channels via
a game theoretic framework. We begin by considering a special power control problem that is the TPC’s
counterpart in multi-carrier systems. In this problem, each user tries to minimize its total transmit power
over all sub-channels in a distributed manner, while maintaining its total data rate above a given threshold
Rˆi. This problem is stated by
min
pi≥0
∑
l
pli (7)
subject to:
∑
log(1 +
Gli,ip
l
i∑
j 6=i
Gli,jp
l
j + η
l
i
) ≥ Rˆi,
6where pli is the transmit power of user i over sub-channel l, and Gli,j is the channel gain from the
transmitter of user i to the receiver of user j on sub-channel l.
In this game, each user tries to choose an optimal power vector pi = [p1i , · · · , pLi ]T, where L is
the number of sub-channels that are utilized to satisfy the data rate constraint, such that the data rate
constraint in (7) is satisfied with the equality. Similar to TPC, in this game, a user with a bad channel
increases its transmit power to satisfy its rate constraint, which can cause more interference to other users,
resulting in higher transmit power levels. To make this algorithm opportunistic, we use a new constraint
and reformulate the objective function. The basic idea is similar to OPC, i.e., users increase their transmit
power in good sub-channels, and do the opposite in bad sub-channels, but in a more profound manner.
This will lead to a higher total throughput and a lower transmit power. We first define the utility of each
user i as its total power over all sub-channels. In opportunistic power control for multi-carrier interference
channels, each user chooses a strategy from its strategy space that maximizes its utility. In other words,
each user consumes more power to achieve a higher data rate. As each user attempts to maximize its
utility (its total power consumed over all sub-channels), we impose a constraint on each user’s transmit
power, and provide it with incentives to behave opportunistically. One choice for the constraint would be∑
l
(pliI
l
i) ≤ ςˆi, (8)
where ςˆi is a predefined upper bound for
∑
l
(pliI
l
i), and
I li =
∑
j 6=i
Gli,jp
l
j + η
l
i
Gli,i
=
∑
j 6=i
Gˆli,jp
l
j + ηˆ
l
i. (9)
Note that, the value of I li depends on power levels of users (i.e., I li(p), but for simplicity in notation, we
use I li .
Considering (8), one can observe that users would allocate more power on good sub-channels. In
addition, the total power consumed by users depends on sub-channel conditions. With this constraint and
the objective functions as the total power over all sub-channels, each user needs to solve a linear program
in which its entire transmit power is assigned only to the best sub-channels, which causes instability in
the iterative algorithm. Moreover, when effective interference levels are the same on some sub-channels,
the problem would have numerous solutions. This means that the convergence analysis of this problem is
very difficult, and convergence would be guaranteed in a very restrictive set of channel conditions. Due
to the above problems, instead of (8), we define a new constraint for each user as∑
l
(pliI
l
i)
2 ≤ ςi, (10)
7where ςi is a predefined upper bound for
∑
l
(pliI
l
i)
2
, and I li is defined in (9).
Similar to (8), applying the constraint (10) would cause each user to transmit at higher power levels on
good sub-channels, and the total transmit power will depend on the channel conditions of sub-channels.
The strategy space of each user is
Pi(p−i) = {pi : pli ≥ 0,
∑
l
(pliI
l
i)
2 ≤ ςi}, (11)
where p−i is the strategies of all users other than user i.
The problem is formulated by the game Go = 〈M,Pi(p−i), {ui}〉, where M is the set of users in the
system, Pi(p−i) is the strategy space of user i defined in (11), and ui is the utility of user i. Each user
aims to solve
max
pi≥0
∑
l
pli (12)
subject to: pi ∈ Pi(p−i),
where Pi(p−i) is defined in (11).
B. Game Analysis
In the opportunistic power control game, each user solves (12) in a distributed manner. Since the
strategy space of user i, i.e., Pi(p−i), depends on the strategies of other users, this game belongs to the
generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems [4]. In such games, in addition to the utility function,
users’ interactions affect their strategy choices. However, this dependence makes the problem hard to
analyze. In what follows, we present an analysis of (12). When users iteratively solve (12), the game
settles at a GNE as defined below.
Definition 1: The strategy vector p = [p*T1 , · · · ,p*TM ]T is a GNE for the game Go if∑
l
pli ≤
∑
l
pl∗i , ∀pi ∈ Pi(p∗−i), ∀i. (13)
When the strategies of other users are fixed, user i solves the optimization problem (12), which is a
convex optimization. To do so, we consider its Lagrangian given by
Li =
∑
l
pli − λi(
∑
l
(pliI
l
i)
2 − ςi). (14)
For a fixed but arbitrary non-negative p−i, we take the derivative of Lagrangian Li with respect to pli,
and write
∂Li
∂pli
= 1− 2λipli(I li)2 = 0. (15)
8Note that at the optimal point, the constraint (10) is satisfied with the equality. Hence, the solution to
(12) is
pli =
1
2λi(I li)
2
, (16)
where λi is obtained such that (10) is satisfied with the equality.
Comparing (16) with (5), one can see their similarity. When the effective interference experienced by
user i on sub-channel l is high, i.e., when the interference from other users is high and/or the direct
channel gain from the transmitter of user i to its corresponding receiver is low, user i consumes less
power on that sub-channel, and when the sub-channel is good, user i increases its transmit power. The
corresponding data rate on that sub-channel is Rli = log (1 + γli), where γli is the SINR of user i on
sub-channel l. If all sub-channels for user i are bad, its total transmit power is reduced, which helps
users with good sub-channels to transmit at higher rates. This means that in our proposed scheme, a
user opportunistically benefits from the reduced transmit power levels of other users who experience bad
sub-channels.
In the game Go, each user updates its transmit power over all sub-channels via (16) in a distributed
and iterative manner. If the power updates converge, they will converge to a GNE of the game. Since
the strategy of a user depends on other users’ strategies, we cannot use the existing analysis in the
literature that are developed for conventional games. Instead, we use the following theorem to prove that
the proposed game always has at least one GNE.
Theorem 1 [4]: Let GGNEP = 〈M,Si(s−i), {ui}〉 be given, where M is the set of players, Si(s−i) is
the strategy set of player i that depends on the strategies of other users, i.e., on s−i, and ui is the utility
function of user i. Suppose that
a) There exist M nonempty, convex and compact sets Ki ⊂ RL such that for every s ∈ RML with
si ∈ Ki for every i, the set Si(s−i) is nonempty, closed, and convex, Si(s−i) ⊆ Ki, and Si, as a
point-to-set map, is both upper and lower semi-continuous;
b) For every player i, the function ui(·, s−i) is quasi-concave on Si(s−i), which is required in our case,
as each user tries to maximize its own utility.
Then a GNE exists for GGNEP.
From Theorem 1, we have the following theorem for the existence of GNE in Go.
Theorem 2: The game Go always admits at least one GNE.
Proof: Consider the set Pi(p−i) as defined in (11). Since each ηˆli in (9) is positive, we define the set
Ki = {pi : 0 ≤ pli ≤ κli}, where κli =
√
ςi
ηˆli
. One can easily see that the assumptions of Theorem 1 are
9satisfied, i.e., the game Go always has at least one GNE. 
Although Theorem 2 states that a GNE always exists for Go, it nevertheless may not be unique. However,
when GNE is not unique, the distributed algorithm may not converge to a GNE, and may toggle between
two GNEs. Below, in Theorem 3 we provide the sufficient conditions for GNE’s uniqueness.
Theorem 3: The GNE in the game Go is unique if matrix A defined as
[A]i,j =

1√
ςi
minl(
√
ql
i
ηˆli) if i = j,
−3√ςimaxl Gˆ
l
i,j
ηˆli
if i 6= j,
(17)
is a P-matrix1, where ql
i
= (pl
i
I li)
2 − σ, σ is a small positive constant, I li = ηˆli, and pli is the minimum
power level of user i on sub-channel l.
Proof: See Appendix A. 
We also provide another sufficient condition for GNE’s uniqueness in Theorem 4 below.
Theorem 4: The GNE in the game Go is unique if
ρ(B) < 1, (18)
where ρ(B) is the spectral radius2 of B, and
[B]i,j =

0 if i = j,
3 ςi
maxl
Gˆl
i,j
ηˆl
i
minl(
√
ql
i
ηˆli)
if i 6= j,
(19)
Proof: See Appendix B. 
When users in the network solve (12), each user chooses its transmit power iteratively in a distributed
manner, and simultaneously with other users according to (16), i.e., pli(n+1) = P (p(n)), where P (·) =
1
2λi(Ili)
2
and p(n) is the transmit power levels of users at iteration n. In the following theorem, we provide
conditions for convergence of this distributed algorithm.
Theorem 5: The distributed iterative power update function converges to the unique GNE of the game
under the same condition as in Theorem 3.
Proof: See Appendix C. 
As stated earlier, global convergence of the distributed algorithm is guaranteed if its GNE is unique.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the conditions for convergence of the algorithm are the same as those
of uniqueness of its GNE.
1A matrix A ∈ Rn×n is called a P-matrix if all of its principal minors are positive [10].
2The spectral radius of matrix B is its maximum absolute eigenvalue.
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IV. PRICING FOR OPPORTUNISTIC POWER CONTROL
In game theoretic distributed schemes, each user selfishly chooses a strategy for optimizing its utility.
However, this may cause unacceptable consequences for other users, but can be controlled via pricing
in the game. Pricing is set in such a way to attain certain desirable characteristics, such as introducing
opportunistic behavior in our case for rate maximization under total power constraint that depends on
interference levels in sub-channels. We denote the game with no pricing by Gr = 〈M,Pi, {ui}〉, where
M is the set of users, Pi is the strategy space of user i defined by Pi = {pi : pi ≥ 0,
∑
l
pli < Pi},
and ui is the total throughput of user i over all sub-channels. Since the strategy space of each user is
independent of other users, this is the conventional game where each user aims to solve
max
pi≥0
∑
l
log(1 +
Gli,ip
l
i∑
j 6=i
Gli,jp
l
j + η
l
i
) (20)
Subject to:
∑
l
pli ≤ Pi.
The solution to (20) is the well known waterfilling, given by
pli =
µi −
∑
j 6=i
Gli,jp
l
j + η
l
i
Gli,i

+
∀l, (21)
where [·] = max(·, 0), and µi is chosen such that the constraint in (20) is satisfied with the equality.
The game Gr has been extensively studied in the literature, and conditions for the uniqueness of its
NE and for the convergence of the distributed algorithm are provided in [7]–[9], [14]. However, as stated
earlier, due to the distributed nature of optimization and selfish behavior of users, the output of the game
may not be a desirable one. Therefore, if users’ behavior is controlled, it may be possible to achieve
certain improvements in utilizing resources such as higher throughputs and lower power levels. To this
end, we propose a pricing mechanism that takes into account the transmit power levels of users as well
as the interference they experience. The proposed pricing is defined by
C(p) = λi
∑
l
pliI
l
i , (22)
where I li is the effective interference experienced by user i on sub-channel l as defined in (9), and λi is the
pricing for user i. When pricing (22) is applied, each user is priced more when its transmit power and/or
its effective received interference are increased. Thus, users would allocate more power on sub-channels
whose interference levels are low.
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When pricing (22) is applied to the data rate maximization problem, each user in the game Gp =
〈M,Pi, {ui}〉 aims to solve
max
pi≥0
∑
l
log(1 +
pli∑
j 6=i
Gˆli,jp
l
j + ηˆ
l
i
)− λi
∑
l
pliI
l
i (23)
Subject to:
∑
l
pli ≤ Pi.
The solution to (23), and the existence of NE for the game Gp are provided in the following theorem.
Theorem 6: The game Gp always admits at least one NE. Moreover, each user chooses its transmit
power over each sub-channel according to
pli =
[
1
µi + λiI li
− I li
]+
, (24)
where I li is defined in (9), and µi is so chosen to satisfy the constraint (23).
Proof: The strategy space of users are non-empty, compact and convex subset of L-dimensional
Euclidian space. The utility function of each user is a continuous function of the power vector p, and is
quasi-concave function of users’ power levels pi. Therefore, the game Gp always has at least one NE.
The solution to the optimization problem (23) which is (24) can be readily obtained using the KKT
conditions for (23). 
In the game Gp, each user updates its transmit power in a distributed and iterative manner by using
(24), where the water level 1
µi+λiIli
depends on the interference that users receive in their sub-channels.
Since µi has the same value for all sub-channels of user i, it is clear that the water levels in those
sub-channels whose interference is higher than those of others is lower, meaning that each user assigns
a smaller power level or no power to those sub-channels. The following theorem provides the conditions
for NE’s uniqueness.
Theorem 7: The NE of Gp is unique if the matrix D defined below is a P-matrix.
[D]i,j =

1 if i = j,
−maxl
(
Gˆli,j
(
1+λiψ
l
i
2
)
ψ
l
j
ψl
i
)
if i 6= j,
(25)
where ψl
i
= ηˆli and ψ
l
i =
∑
j
Gˆli,jPj + ηˆ
l
i and Pj is defined in (23).
Proof: See Appendix D. 
Users in Gp update their power levels in a distributed and iterative manner according to (24). In the
following theorem, we provide the sufficient condition for convergence of the distributed algorithm.
Theorem 8: Suppose that the matrix D in (25) is a P-matrix. When users update their power levels
simultaneously according to (24), the distributed algorithm converges to the unique NE of the game.
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Proof: See Appendix E. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We now present simulation results for the proposed opportunistic power control game as well as the
pricing mechanism. The system under study is the uplink of a multi-carrier network consisting of one
base station and 5 users.
For the opportunistic power control, the system has 20 sub-channels. The interfering channel gain from
the transmitter of user j to the receiver of user i on sub-channel l is chosen randomly from (0, 0.1
i
),
where i denotes the user number, and the normalized noise power is set to 0.01 Watts. Accordingly, the
channel conditions become better from user 1 to user 5. For an instance of the network realization, we
run the proposed algorithm and show the results in Fig. 1. Note that user 1 whose sub-channels are bad
consumes less power and achieves a low data rate, and user 5 with the best sub-channels transmits with
high power and achieves a high data rate.
Next, we fix the channel conditions of all users except user 5 for which in four steps, we gradually
deteriorate its channel conditions. The results are shown in Fig. 2. As expected, user 5 decreases its
transmit power levels, and as the conditions for other users improve, they increase their transmit power
levels.
As stated earlier, the behavior of the proposed algorithm is in the opposite direction of tracking a target
data rate as in (7). We repeat our simulations and compare the results to those of (7) in Fig. 3. As can
be seen, in (7), as the channel condition of user 5 deteriorates, its transmit power is increased to achieve
its target data rate. This is in contrast to our proposed algorithm, where this user decreases its transmit
power to reduce its interference to other users. Note that, in our proposed opportunistic scheme, at step
4, there is a 37 percent reduction in the transmit power as compared to that of the power minimization
game (7), but the total data rate is reduced by 9 percent, which shows the efficiency of our proposed
scheme. In addition, using (7) may cause the system to become infeasible, whereas this would not happen
in our proposed game.
In the sequel, we present simulation results for the proposed pricing. The network setup is similar to
the previous simulations except that now we have 10 sub-channels. First we show the effect of pricing
on the users’ transmit power levels in Fig. 4. Note that pricing affects those users with bad channels
more than other users, and forces such users to reduce their transmit power levels more than those users
with good channels, as we desired.
In the next two simulations, we compare the effects of our proposed pricing with those of fixed
13
pricing used in [17]. We first run the algorithm with our proposed pricing, and after convergence, use the
multiplication of pricing and the effective interference over each sub-channel as the fixed pricing in [17].
We then use the fixed pricing for subsequent steps in which the channel for user 5 gradually deteriorates.
The power levels are shown in Fig. 5, and data rates in Fig. 6. Note that, at step 6 for our proposed
pricing, the total data rates of users is about 3 percent less than that of the fixed pricing, but the total
transmit power levels is about 15 percent less than that of the fixed pricing.
Next simulations reverse the previous one, meaning that the channels for user 5 are gradually improved
at successive steps. The power levels are shown in Fig. 7, and data rates in Fig. 8. Note that at step
6, the total data rates of users as well as the total transmit power levels are about 10 percent higher as
compared to those of the fixed pricing.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed an opportunistic power control for multi-carrier systems, in which each sub-channel is
shared among all users. In such a power control framework, each user transmits at lower power levels on
bad sub-channels, and does the opposite on good sub-channels. We showed that in the proposed game there
always exists a generalized Nash equilibrium, and provided the sufficient conditions for GNE’s uniqueness
and for convergence of the distributed algorithm. Furthermore, we proposed a pricing mechanism for the
data rate maximization problem when the total transmit power of each user is constrained depending on
the interference levels on sub-channels. In such cases, we also provided the sufficient conditions for GNE’s
uniqueness, and for convergence of the distributed algorithm. By way of simulations, we demonstrated
the improved performances of our proposed schemes as compared to those of existing algorithms.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We utilize variational inequalities to prove the uniqueness of NE for the game (12). To do so, we use
the following definition for variational inequalities.
Definition 2 [15]: The variational inequality denoted by V I(K,F), where K is a subset of Rn and
F : K → Rn, is to find a vector x ∈ K such that (y− x)TF(x) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ K.
For the opportunistic power control game (12), the strategy space of each user depends on the strategies
chosen by other users. Therefore, we cannot directly apply the variational inequality formulation to the
game, and some reformulations are needed. Let µli be the multiplier corresponding to the nonnegativity
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constraint and λi the multiplier of the power constraint (10). The KKT conditions of the optimization
problem (12) are
− 1 + 2λipli(I li)2 − µli = 0, ∀l, i, (26)
µli ≥ 0 ⊥ pli ≥ 0, ∀l, i, (27)
λi ≥ 0 ⊥
∑
l
(pliI
l
i)
2 ≤ ςi, ∀i, (28)
where a⊥b means that vectors a and b are perpendicular. Note that λi > 0, otherwise the condition
(26) will lead to µli < 0, which contradicts (27). This means that the constraint
∑
l
pliI
l
i
2 ≤ ςi is satisfied
with equality. By eliminating the multipliers µli, the KKT conditions can be reformulated as a nonlinear
complementarity problem
pli ≥ 0 ⊥ − 1 + 2λipli(I li)2 ≥ 0, ∀l, i, (29)
λi ≥ 0 ⊥
∑
l
(pliI
l
i)
2 − ςi = 0, ∀i. (30)
We define the variable qli by
qli = (p
l
iI
l
i)
2, (31)
and use it to reformulate (10) as ∑
l
qli = ςi. (32)
Note that qli = 0 if and only if pli = 0. On the other hand, for each value of ql = [qli]Mi=1, the
corresponding values of pli can be obtained using the OPC algorithm. Hence, we write pli = θli(ql). Since
θli(·) is a continuous function of ql [6], and considering pli and I li as functions of ql, we reformulate the
conditions (29) and (30) by
qli ≥ 0 ⊥ − 1 + 2λipli(I li)2 ≥ 0, ∀l, i, (33)
λi ≥ 0 ⊥
∑
l
qli = ςi, ∀i, . (34)
Note that the variable qli is nonnegative, i.e., qli > 0. One can see from (16) that pli is always positive, i.e.,
pli > 0, and since I li > 0, we have qli > 0. The maximum power level for each user on each sub-channel
is pli =
√
ςi
ηˆli
.
Now suppose that all users except user i transmit at their maximum power levels only on sub-channel
l. The minimum power level of user i on sub-channel l, denoted by pl
i
, is obtained from (16). Therefore,
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qli > q
l
i
, where ql
i
= (pl
i
I li)
2 − σ and σ is a small positive constant, and I li = ηˆli. From the above, we
change the conditions (33) and (34) as
qli − qli ≥ 0 ⊥ − 1 + 2λipli(I li)2 ≥ 0, ∀l, i, (35)
λi ≥ 0 ⊥
∑
l
qli = ςi, ∀i. (36)
The conditions in (35) and (36) are not equivalent to (33) and (34). However, all solutions to (33) and (34)
are also solutions to (35) and (36). The change in (33) may yield additional solutions to (35) and (36).
Thus, solutions to (35) and (36) consist of all solutions to (33) and (34) plus possible other solutions.
Note that λi > 0. We further reformulate (35) and (36) into a more suitable form as
qli − qli ≥ 0 ⊥ ξi − log(p
l
i) + log(q
l
i) ≥ 0, ∀l, i, (37)
ξi ∈ R,
∑
l
qli = ςi, ∀i. (38)
We use log transform because we wish to eliminate the multiplication of the power pli and the effective
interference I li . It is obvious that (37) and (38) are the KKT conditions of the variational inequality
V I(X ,F) where X =∏
i
Xi and Xi = {qi ∈ RL : qli ≥ qli,
∑
l
qli = ςi}, and F li = log(qli)− log(pli). With
this modification, we now provide conditions for GNE’s uniqueness. Note that all GNEs of the game
are solutions to V I(X ,F). However, the variational inequality may have additional solutions. Hence,
the conditions for uniqueness of the solution to V I(X ,F) guarantee GNE’s uniqueness as well. This
condition, however, may be excessive, since solutions to V I(X ,F) may not be the GNE of the game.
Let q̂ = q(1) and q˜ = q(2) be two solutions to V I(X ,F). This means that for each user i, we have∑
l
(qli(2)− qli(1))
(
− log(pli(1)) + log(qli(1))
)
≥ 0, (39)
∑
l
(qli(1)− qli(2))
(
− log(pli(2)) + log(qli(2))
)
≥ 0. (40)
In addition, from the definition of qli, we have
log(qli(2))− log(qli(1)) = 2
(
log(pli(2)) − log(pli(1)) + log(I li(2)) − log(I li(1))
)
. (41)
We add (39) and (40), and write∑
l
(qli(1)− qli(2))
(
log(pli(2)) − log(pli(1)) + 2 log(I li(2)) − 2 log(I li(1))
)
≥ 0. (42)
From the mean value theorem, we know that there exists a qli(1) ≤ qli ≤ qli(2) such that
qli(1)− qli(2) = qli
(
log(qli(1)) − log(qli(2))
)
. (43)
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Therefore, using (41) and (43), (42) can be written as∑
l
qli
(
log(pli(1))− log(pli(2)) + log(I li(1)) − log(I li(2)
)
(
log(pli(2))− log(pli(1)) + 2 log(I li(2)) − 2 log(I li(1))
)
≥ 0. (44)
Rearranging (44) and using Schwarz’s inequality, we get√∑
l
qli
(
log(pli(1))− log(pli(2))
)2 ≤ 3√∑
l
qli
(
log(I li(1))− log(I li(2))
)2
, (45)
or equivalently
‖√q(log(p(1)) − log(p(2)))‖ ≤ 3‖√q(log(I(1)) − log(I(2)))‖, (46)
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidian norm. Again, we use the mean value theorem for log(pli) and log(I li),
and write √√√√∑
l
qli(
pli(1)− pli(2)
pli
)2 ≤ 3
√√√√∑
l
qli(
I li(1) − I li(2)
I li
)2, (47)
and √√√√∑
l
qli(
pli(1) − pli(2)
pli
)2 ≤ 3
√∑
l
qli(
1
I li
∑
j 6=i
Gˆli,j(p
l
j(1) − plj(2)))2. (48)
Note that pli ≤
√
ςi
ηˆli
, I li ≥ ηˆli, and qli ≤ qli ≤ ςi. From (49), we obtain
1√
ςi
min
l
(
√
ql
i
ηˆli)
√∑
l
(pli(1) − pli(2))2 ≤ 3
∑
j 6=i
√
ςimax
l
Gˆli,j
ηˆli
√∑
l
(plj(1) − plj(2))2. (49)
Defining [a]i =
√∑
l
(pli(1) − pli(2))2 and considering the matrix A defined in (17), we obtain Aa ≤ 0.
Therefore, if the matrix A is a P-matrix, we have a = 0, and hence the proof.
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From (49), one obtains√∑
l
(pli(1) − pli(2))2 ≤ 3
∑
j 6=i
√
ςimaxl
Gˆli,j
ηˆli
1√
ςi
minl(
√
ql
i
ηˆli)
√
(
∑
l
(plj(1) − plj(2)))2, (50)
If the matrix
[B̂]i,j =

1 if i = j,
−3
√
ςi maxl
Gˆl
i,j
ηˆl
i
1√
ςi
minl(
√
ql
i
ηˆli)
if i 6= j,
(51)
is a P-matrix, GNE is unique. From the P-property of the matrix, this is equivalent to the spectral condition
in (18).
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Note that at each iteration, say n+ 1, the parameters qli and power vectors are related by
qli(n+ 1) = (p
l
i(n+ 1)I
l
i(p(n))2. (52)
Since they are the solutions of the game (12), we have
qli(n+ 1)− qli ≥ 0, ξ
n+1
i − log(pli(n+ 1)) + log(qli(n+ 1)) ≥ 0, (53)
ξn+1i ∈ R,
∑
l
qli(n+ 1) = ςi. (54)
Therefore, with pli(1) = pli(n + 1) and pli(2) = pl∗i , where pl∗i is the GNE of the game, one can follow
the same line as in proof of Theorem 3 to obtain the following inequality
1√
ςi
min
l
(
√
ql
i
ηˆli)
√∑
l
(pli(n+ 1)− pl∗i )2 ≤ 3
∑
j 6=i
√
ςimax
l
Gˆli,j
ηˆli
√
(
∑
l
(plj(n + 1)− pl∗j ))2. (55)
Using (55) and the P-property of matrix A defined in (17), one can easily derive the condition.
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Let µi be the multiplier corresponding to the power constraint (24). The KKT conditions for the
optimization problem (23) can be reformulated as the following complementarity problem
pli ≥ 0 ⊥ − (
1∑
j
Gˆli,jp
l
j + ηˆ
l
i
) + λiI
l
i + µi ≥ 0, ∀l, i, (56)
µi ≥ 0 ⊥
∑
l
pli ≤ Pi, ∀i. (57)
These are the KKT conditions for V I(X ,F), where X =∏
i
Xi and Xi = {pi ∈ RL : pli ≥ 0,
∑
l
pli ≤ Pi},
and
F li (p) = −(
1∑
j
Gˆli,jp
l
j + ηˆ
l
i
) + λiI
l
i . (58)
Since each set Xi is closed and convex, and F li (·) is continuous, V I(X ,F) has a solution. Since the set
X is a Cartesian product of some independent closed and convex sets, it is known [15] that V I(X ,F)
has a unique solution if F(·) is uniformly P-function, which means that there exists a constant c such
that for every p ∈ X and p′ ∈ X , we have
max
i
(pi − p′i)(Fi(p)− Fi(p)) ≥ c‖p− p′‖2. (59)
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Therefore, it suffices to prove that the function F (·) is uniformly P-function. For F(·), we have
F li (p)− F li (p′)) =
∑
j
Gˆli,j(p
l
j − plj
′
)
(
∑
j
Gˆli,jp
l
j + ηˆ
l
i)(
∑
j
Gˆli,jp
l
j
′
+ ηˆli)
+ λi
∑
j 6=i
Gˆli,j(p
l
j − plj
′
). (60)
We define the following variables
ψli =
√
(
∑
j
Gˆli,jp
l
j + ηˆ
l
i)(
∑
j
Gˆli,jp
l
j
′
+ ηˆli), (61)
and write
(pi − p′i)(Fi(p)− Fi(p)) =
∑
l
(pli − pli
′
)
∑
j
Gˆli,j(p
l
j − plj
′
)
(
∑
j
Gˆli,jp
l
j + ηˆ
l
i)(
∑
j
Gˆli,jp
l
j
′
+ ηˆli)
(62)
+λi
∑
j 6=i
Gˆli,j(p
l
j − plj
′
) =
∑
l
(pli − pli
′
)2
ψli
2 +
∑
l
(pli − pli
′
)
∑
j 6=i
Gˆli,j
(
1 + λiψ
l
i
2
)
(plj − plj
′
)
ψli
2 (63)
≥
∑
l
(pli − pli
′
)2
ψli
2 −
∑
j 6=i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
l
(pli − pli
′
)(plj − plj
′
)
Gˆli,j
(
1 + λiψ
l
i
2
)
ψli
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (64)
≥
∑
l
(pli − pli
′
)2
ψli
2 −
∑
j 6=i
max
l
Gˆli,j
(
1 + λiψ
l
i
2
)
ψlj
ψli
√√√√∑
l
(pli − pli
′
)2
ψli
2
√√√√∑
l
(plj − plj
′
)2
ψlj
2
 , (65)
where we applied Schwartz’ inequality to (64). By some manipulations, one can obtain the following
inequality
(pi − p′i)(Fi(p)− Fi(p)) ≥ [d]i[Dd]i, (66)
where d is a vector whose ith element is [d]i =
√∑
l
(pli−pli′)2
ψli
2 and D is defined in (25). From (66) and
the P-property assumption on matrix D, one can show that F(·) is uniformly P-function [10], [17].
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To prove the convergence of the algorithm, we follow the same line as in the proof of Theorem 5.
Given the power profile p(n) at iteration n, users update their power levels according to (24). This means
that their power levels pli(n + 1) must satisfy the following optimality condition∑
l
(pli − pli(n+ 1))(−
1∑
j 6=i
Gˆli,jp
l
j(n) + ηˆ
l
i
+ λI li(p(n))). (67)
19
The NE must also satisfy a similar condition, i.e.,∑
l
(pli − pli
∗
)(− 1∑
j 6=i
Gˆli,jp
l
j
∗
+ ηˆli
+ λI li(p
∗)). (68)
Adding these two inequalities and following the same steps as in Theorem 5, this theorem is proved.
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Fig. 1. Data rates and power levels of users in our proposed opportunistic power control algorithm. Channel conditions for
user i+ 1 is better than that of user i.
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Fig. 2. Data rates and power levels of users in our proposed opportunistic power control algorithm when channel conditions
for user 5 gradually worsens.
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Fig. 4. The effect of pricing on the converged power levels.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of converged values of power levels using fixed pricing and those of our proposed pricing when channel
conditions for user 5 gradually worsens.
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Fig. 6. Comparison of converged data rates using fixed pricing and those of our proposed pricing when channel conditions for
user 5 gradually worsens.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of converged power levels using fixed pricing and those of our proposed pricing when channel conditions
for user 5 gradually improves.
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Fig. 8. Comparison of converged data rates using fixed pricing and those of our proposed pricing when channel conditions for
user 5 gradually improves.
